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ABSTRACT
I attempt to resolve the question of whether keeping animals as pets
is akin to slavery by considering the significance of liberty to human
beings and to nonhuman animals. I distinguish between two senses
of liberty: preference liberty and autonomous liberty. Preference liberty is the freedom to satisfy the preferences that one in fact has.
Autonomous liberty is the ability to satisfy the preferences that one
might have regardless of whether one actually has those preferences.
Preference liberty has a value for animals, but autonomous liberty is
meaningless for them. As the core wrong of slavery is the restriction
of autonomous liberty, I conclude that pet-keeping is not akin to slavery, though in practice it is often morally wrong for other reasons.
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The Polarized Views of Pet-Keeping
The moral defensibility of keeping non-human animals
(henceforth, “animals”) is a subject that tends to elicit polarized opinions. Among animal rights advocates, it is sometimes
regarded as a form of exploitation akin to slavery. Many in the
general public, on the other hand, find this stance laughable in
light of the supposedly pampered status of most household pets
compared with wild animals. “My cat isn’t my slave,” goes the
common jocular rejoinder; “I’m his!” This imagined dilemma
between pets as pampered or pets as slaves is a false one. Both
could be true, or neither, because slavery and cruel treatment
are distinct issues.
All too often, it is supposed that – a few bad owners aside
– pets have lives of exceptional happiness. Hilary Bok, while
recognizing that “on occasion, life with pets can go badly
wrong,” confidently asserts that “domesticated animals such as
cats and dogs are typically happy living in human households”
and “For the most part, the interest of pets and their owners
do not diverge in any serious way” (2011, 769). She regards
pet-keeping as much less problematic than animal research or
farming because “Pet owners’ intentions are both generally benign and focused on nonhuman animals as individuals” (2011,
770). According to Bok, dogs and cats “have much better lives
with humans than they would in the wild” (2011, 769), though
David DeGrazia points out that comparing the lives of domestic animals to the lives they would have in the wild makes little
sense; even a neglected dog is likely better off than a stray simply because dogs are highly domesticated in a way that makes
them unsuited for a life in the wild (DeGrazia 2011, 743-44).
Some authors have rightly called into question the idea that
pets are generally treated with such a high level of care. In
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sharp contrast to Bok, Charles Danten regards the relationship
as disastrous for animals: “I am not making an assertion that
happy pets do not exist, but if they do, they are few and far
between. Well-being in a dependent relationship is possible
only if all of the needs of the dependent animal are met. In
the framework of captivity, this condition can be fulfilled only
rarely or partially” (2015, 90). Danten’s view, while very likely
true of exotic animals, is implausibly pessimistic for highlydomesticated animals such as dogs, whose adaptation to human contact and domestic life has been cultivated over millennia. On the other hand, Bok’s utopian view is no less dubious,
and Danten provides numerous anecdotes from his career as
a veterinarian to illustrate the selfishness that guides many
people’s treatment of their pets. Likewise, Bernard Rollin cites
frivolous “euthanasia,” irresponsible acquisition and abandonment, ignorance of an animal’s needs and nature, and elective
surgery such as de-clawing and ear-cropping as examples of
the widespread harms inflicted by pet-keepers on the animals
under their care (2006, 297-307), and Varner echoes this (2002,
468-70, 473). Stuart Spencer et al. highlight apparent inconsistencies between what the public condemns about farming (debeaking chickens, for instance) and what they tolerate toward
pets (cropping dogs’ tails, for instance) (2006, 24). Though
their intention seems to be to present a reductio against these
objections to industrial farming, it works better as a condemnation and call for reform of pet-keeping practices. In light of the
widespread disregard for the needs and desires of pets and the
low priority their interests are given in conflicts with human
members of the household, the general perception of them as
too “pampered” to pose real ethical concerns is much too rosy.
Clearly pet-keeping is highly problematic in common practice,
contrary to the blithe assertion that pets cannot be slaves because they are so pampered.
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Granting that pets are not always or often as happy as one
might like to think, the question remains: what if they were?
Would ending harmful and irresponsible treatment of pets be
enough to transform pet-keeping (or companion animal guardianship, as might be a better term for the ideal relationship) into
a just institution? Not if it is indeed a form of slavery, because
the deepest wrong of slavery is not in its cruelty. Even the most
pleasantly-treated human slave suffers a severe violation by being deprived of liberty. The fact that care and concern may be
lavished on an animal does not itself prove that the animal is
not a slave. Perhaps even the most idealized pet-human relationship is still “benign slavery.” By that term I do not intend to
endorse any slavery at all as morally permissible, nor to lessen
the essential wrong of slavery. Instead, I merely use it to designate a (probably merely hypothetical) state of slavery in which
the enslaved individual is provided with a pleasant life free of
significant suffering and want. If pet-keeping is a form of slavery, then no matter how well we treat our pets, the relationship
by its nature is morally wrong.
Those who assert that pets live a luxurious life in order to
counter the claim that they are slaves have made two errors:
first, they have not taken a hard enough look at how pets are
actually treated in common practice, and second, they have
failed to realize that being treated kindly and being a slave are
not mutually exclusive. Those who contend that pet-keeping is
a form of slavery have made a different error, one that I intend
to focus on henceforth. I will argue that pet-keeping is not comparable to slavery. It may be that the institution ought still to be
abolished, because of the frequent harm done to pet animals by
irresponsible pet-keepers, and the difficulty of causing the social change needed to end this harm. Any wrongfulness of petkeeping, however, does not come from a similarity to slavery.
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Criticism and Defenses of Pet-Keeping
Several authors have criticized our relationship with domestic animals by evoking the specter of slavery. Marjorie Spiegel’s The Dreaded Comparison is an extended comparison between human slavery and our treatment of animals, though she
discusses pets only briefly, with laboratory and farm animals
occupying most of her concern. “We might look at the relationship between a dog and his master, just one example of what is
sometimes a modern slave/slave-owner relationship . . . . If a
dog wishes to do something other than what pleases his master
. . . he may be beaten or otherwise punished. All independent
actions are thus discouraged” (Spiegel 1996, 41). Spiegel, however, notably refers to the dog-human relationship as sometimes
a slave/slave-owner relationship, which recalls Bok’s argument
that the relationship can, with the right attitude on the part of
the pet’s caretaker, be morally acceptable.
Danten discusses the wrongfulness of pet-keeping more extensively in his work titled (in English) Slaves of Our Affection: The Myth of the Happy Pet. Most of it is about the cruelty
inflicted on pets for the sake of selfishness and convenience
rather than on the concept of slavery per se, but the appendix
contains a provocative quotation from James Stirling detailing his observations of slaves in the American South, to which
Danten has added words parenthetically to show how it can
easily be adapted to describe our relationships with domestic
animals. So when Stirling tells us that “the house servant is
comparatively well off” and benefits from greater affection
from the master than the plantation hand, Danten reads “pet”
for “house servant” and “farm animal” for “plantation hand”;
in other words, while pets may be subject to less severe mistreatment, they are no less slaves (2015, 255-56). Again, however, the focus is on the cruelties inflicted: Danten believes that
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the life of a pet is only a less severe mistreatment than that of
the farm animal, and believes that pets that are not mistreated
at all are rare to nonexistent (Danten 2015; 90, 254).
As previously argued, focusing on the suffering or privation
inflicted on pets does not entirely address the question, since
it is at least theoretically possible that a pet could be free from
significant suffering or privation (including boredom, loneliness, or other emotional harms) and still be a slave. Leslie Irvine offers a typical example of such an argument, stating that
“...the perpetuation of our pleasure is not sufficient reason to
enslave other animals” (2004, 5). While acknowledging that a
welfarist (utilitarian) position would permit pet-keeping if the
institution were significantly modified, she endorses a deontological approach drawn from Tom Regan and Gary Francione,
stating that animals have inherent value and therefore cannot
be treated as property: “If we recognize the intrinsic value of
animals’ lives, then it is immoral to keep them for our pleasure,
regardless of whether we call them companions or pets” (Irvine
2004; 11, 14). She concludes that although she does not herself
regard the animals in her household as property, “...outside of
the household, that is exactly their status. I am free to pamper
them or ignore them, as long as I am not caught inflicting intentional cruelty” (2004, 14). Francione has made a very similar argument. The institution of “pet ownership,” according to
Francione, violates animals’ right not to be treated as things,
because it considers pets to be property. “You may treat your
animal companion as a member of your family and accord her
or him inherent value or the basic right not to be treated as your
resource. But your treatment of your animal really means that
you regard your animal property as having more than market
value; should you change your mind . . . your decision will be
protected by the law” (Francione 2007, 169).
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While Bok’s view of pets is dubiously rosy, her reply to
Francione (and, by extension, Irvine) is strong. The fact that
the law currently treats pets in a certain way does not mean that
it always must or that we cannot do better then the law requires
in the meantime. “The problem with our current system, is . . .
that it gives us rights over nonhuman animals that we arguably
ought not to have,” according to Bok. “Fortunately, this system
does not force us to exercise those rights. We can, and should,
treat our pets in just the same way that we would if the laws
governing nonhuman animals are exactly as they should be”
(2011, 776). That society regards pets – and all animals – as
mere property with no legal rights is true and deplorable, but
the question of whether pet-keeping is intrinsically and necessarily wrong remains.
Irvine regards the relationship between human and pet as
necessarily exploitative, but this seems to rest on the assumption that “keeping animals for our pleasure” must mean “keeping them for our pleasure without regard to their own interests.” That is the essence of exploitation, but it need not be the
case in our relationships with companion animals. Just as I can
maintain friendships because they give me pleasure without
necessarily treating my friends as mere means for my pleasure,
I can take pleasure in relationships with animals without necessarily treating them as mere means. Friendships are (or should
be) mutually beneficial, just as the defenders of pet-keeping
would argue our relationships with animals can be.
Kristien Hens explicitly rejects the idea that companion animals, particularly dogs, are slaves on the grounds that the relationship would not be so successful if owners treated them
as slaves: “Repressive training techniques destroy the dog-human relationship rather than build it... It is indeed questionable
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whether the relationship dog-human would have been so successful if they were merely man’s tools” (2009, 6). Nevertheless, the challenge is not so easily dismissed. Training techniques can be kind, the owner can be loving and caring, and the
animals may benefit in many ways from the relationship, but
pets are still under our control. Even if they were granted legal
protections that distinguish them from property, they would
still not be free agents. What account, if any, can be offered for
the legitimacy of such a relationship?
Discussions of the pet-human relationship by authors that
accept the moral permissibility of such a relationship have often focused on what duties one has to one’s pets, taking as a
given that such relationships are (or can be) morally permissible (Burgess-Jackson 1998, Varner 2002). Among those that
address the question of moral permissibility itself, there are
three primary approaches. The first is to argue that the captivity of domestic animals is for their own good because we
have molded them into creatures who are not capable of living
“in the wild.” Gary E. Varner writes, “On any plausible ethical
theory, the keeping of pets who meet the conditions for being companion animals and domesticated partners is almost
surely going to be permissible. At a base minimum, dogs to a
significant degree need to live among humans in order to live
well...” (2002, 464; cf. Bok 2011, 777). But this fails to note the
difference between “we need to keep these dogs for their own
good” and “we should continue to encourage the institution of
pet-keeping.” A critic of pet-keeping such as Francione or Irvine will argue that we must keep the domestic animals who
currently exist but ensure no more of them are bred. “As much
as I enjoy living with dogs,” Francione writes, “were there only
two dogs remaining in the world, I would not be in favor of
breeding them” (2007, 170). The goal ought to be to phase out
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the institution, with the presence of pets in our lives prior to
that time being a necessary evil. Bok dismisses this as a possibility without argument (2011, 777), but it is not clearly absurd.
The second approach is to say that pet-keeping is justified
so long as the animal derives benefit from it. Varner says that
“the keeping of companion animals and domesticated partners
can be justified to the extent that both keeper and pet genuinely
benefit from the relationship” (2002, 465). Those holding the
position that pet-keeping is slavery are unlikely to find this argument convincing. It is reminiscent of Aristotle, who stated
that “domestic animals are by nature better than wild ones,
and it is better for all of them to be ruled by human beings,
since in this way they secure their preservation” (2016, 627),
but Aristotle believes the same of the allegedly less-rational
human beings whom he construed as “natural slaves.” Just as
a non-rational animal is better off being ruled by a rational
human being, so it is that “slavery is both advantageous and
just” for these natural slaves (Aristotle 2016, 627). This comparison, though offered in defense of human slavery, now has
the unintended effect of casting suspicion on arguments that
justify control over animals on the basis of the benefits they are
alleged to receive. Spiegel regards them as bad-faith attempts
to obscure the actual misery of domestic animals, as in the case
of a factory farm worker who claims the chickens are “happy”
because they are protected from predators and receive regular
food, despite the fact that she can plainly see that they live in
miserable conditions (1996, 75-76). No doubt such claims that
domestic animals are happy are often unfounded and serve
only as rationalizations for their use, but let us continue to consider the theoretical possibility that a slave may truly be better
off, in the sense of having needs and desires met, by entering
into slavery. Such benign slavery would still be slavery.
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The third approach is to characterize the relationship as
a sort of contract. Rollin takes such an approach: “One may
choose to see the human relationship to the dog as involving
something like a social contract, in which animals give up their
free, wild, pack nature to live in human society in return for
care, leadership, and food” (2006, 289). Rollin states that “According to some ethologists... humans have actually developed
the dog into a creature whose natural pack structure has been
integrated into human society, with the human master playing
the traditional role of pack leader. It is hard to imagine a more
vivid and pervasive example of a social contract...” (2006, 290).
He claims that this holds for other domestic animals also (2006,
290).
Clare Palmer offers a convincing criticism of the idea of a
domestic animal contract with human beings. Palmer identifies four components of a social contract: a transition from one
state to another (e.g. from a state of nature to a state of culture),
limitations on some freedoms, free and equal individuals who
understand and consent to the contract, and benefits to all parties to the contract (1997, 414). Palmer concludes that the relationship with domestic animals meets the first two criteria but
the last two are problematic.
The third criterion is a problem because animals cannot understand the contract, and there is unequal power between the
contractors (Palmer 1997, 417). She considers different models
of the social contract that have emerged to resolve the apparent
lack of a literal historical contract (and the fact that the existence of such contract may not in any case be binding on the
descendants of the original contractors). On the tacit consent
model, certain actions are interpreted as tacit consent to the
social contract – for instance, willingly deriving benefits from
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the contract. On the hypothetical consent model, one looks at
whether someone “would have consented” to the social contract. Neither of these models applies well to animals, because
the fact that domestication has given animals no viable option other than the current state of affairs “makes a mockery
of the idea of either tacit or hypothetical consent” (1997, 421).
Palmer concludes that “key aspects of the social contract and
the domesticated animal contract are fundamentally different:
the animal contract could not be said to be created by equal
individuals, it is not clearly advantageous to all animals and it
is dependent either on a controversial idea of tacit consent or
on an extremely abstract kind of hypothetical consent” (1997,
421-422).
None of the three approaches adequately respond to the concern that pet-keeping is a form of slavery. In order to determine
whether this concern is warranted, we must inquire into the
nature of slavery and its wrongfulness for human beings, and
then see how or whether that transfers to animals.

Liberty, Autonomy, and Slavery
Slavery clearly involves a limitation of freedom. But the
term “freedom” encompasses several different concepts, so
it is important to determine which senses of freedom are involved. First, one might speak of freedom in regard to the
agent’s internal capacities – in other words, freedom of will.
Second, one might speak of freedom in terms of how the agent
is treated by others or affected by outside forces (for instance,
whether restraints are placed on the agent by others). It is important to avoid conflating these two senses of freedom, and
also important to understand their relationship with each other.
For the sake of precision, various terms have been introduced
for the varieties of freedom.
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DeGrazia distinguishes between liberty and autonomy. He
states that “Liberty or freedom of action is the absence of external constraints – such as prison walls or coercive measures
– that impede one from doing what one wants,” (1996, 204)
whereas autonomy, following Gerald Dworkin, is “a secondorder capacity to reflect critically upon one’s first-order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these
or to change them in light of higher-order preferences and values” (Dworkin, quoted in DeGrazia 1996, 205). The temptation might be to regard liberty, so defined, as a more basic and
bare-bones variety of freedom, and autonomy as a richer and
more robust freedom. They are not precisely paired concepts,
however. DeGrazia’s definition of liberty makes it freedom in
the external sense (absence of limitations), whereas autonomy
refers to freedom in the internal sense (freedom of will).
Alasdair Cochrane uses the terms “liberty” and “freedom”
interchangeably, but distinguishes between three senses of liberty. Negative liberty “refers to being free from interference
and constraints,” positive liberty “refers to an individual’s ability to control his or her own life: to self-govern and to selfrule,” and republican liberty “refers to the absence of domination” (Cochrane 2009, 663). Cochrane states that “whichever
conception is adopted, most people consider freedom to be an
absolutely fundamental interest of human beings,” but his own
assumption that human slavery always violates an interest in
liberty (2009, 665) paired with his admission that “benevolent”
slavery may be compatible with negative liberty (2009, 663)
suggests that he adopts a positive or republican conception of
“liberty.” Cochrane, like DeGrazia, uses Dworkin’s definition
of autonomy, interpreting it as “the capacity to frame, revise,
and pursue one’s own conception of the good” (2009, 665).
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While I will adopt “liberty” to refer to an external variety of
freedom and “autonomy” to refer to an internal variety, I want
to introduce further distinctions and clarifications on both sides
of the fence. In the domain of free will, we should distinguish
between autonomy in DeGrazia’s sense and what might be
called freedom of choice. Various authors have used different
terms for these ideas while retaining the essential distinction.
Kantians refer to autonomy (in Kant’s terms, Wille) as opposed
to the power of choice (in Kant’s terms, Willkür). Others have
characterized both of these concepts as varieties of autonomy.
Regan refers to the Kantian sense of autonomy, which requires
the ability to deliberate and reflectively evaluate the merits of
different actions, and contrasts it with “preference autonomy,”
which only requires that one have “preferences and have the
ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them” (2004,
84-85). Similarly, Steven Wise distinguishes between “full
autonomy” (which he identifies with the Kantian conception)
and “practical autonomy,” which merely requires the ability to
choose appropriate actions with an aim to satisfying desires
(2002, 30-32). Andrew Sneddon adopts the terms “deep autonomy” to mean having a life-plan, which “requires reflection, foresight, self-assessment, sensitivity to values that might
structure a life, [and] knowledge of the kinds of life one [might]
pursue,” and “shallow autonomy” to mean uncoerced choice
(2001, 107). For the sake of simplicity, and to avoid confusion,
I will reserve “autonomy” to refer to the reflective, end-setting
variety (Kantian, full, or deep autonomy), and will use “freedom of choice” for the other capacity (preference, practical, or
shallow autonomy).
The term “liberty” conceals another useful distinction. Consider, again, DeGrazia’s definition of liberty: “the absence of
external constraints – such as prison walls or coercive mea-
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sures – that impede one from doing what one wants.” Cochrane
correctly notes that it is possible to imagine a slave who is
not impeded from doing what she wants, especially if “what
she wants” has been shaped in certain ways (2009, 666). The
impediment moves from actual to hypothetical. The slave in
our thought experiment is not prevented from doing what she
wants, but what she might have wanted. My argument hangs on
the significance of this distinction. I will therefore revise DeGrazia’s definition of liberty to distinguish between two kinds
of liberty. The first I will call “preference liberty”: the absence
of external constraints that impede one from doing what one
(in fact) wants. The second I will call “autonomous liberty”:
the absence of external constraints that impede one from doing what one might have wanted. Preference liberty is valuable
because it permits the exercise of choice, which allows one to
pursue (or attempt to pursue) one’s goals. Any creature with
preferences and the ability to exercise choice will benefit from
preference liberty. Autonomous liberty is, as the name suggests, only relevant to beings possessing autonomy, because it
is the ability to reflect on and revise one’s ends that makes such
a counterfactual meaningful.
It is generally assumed that normal, adult human beings
possess autonomy as well as freedom of choice, but nonhuman animals (at least of the kinds we normally keep as pets)
possess only the second of these. “It is highly unlikely that any
animal is autonomous in the Kantian sense,” according to Regan (2004, 84). Our understanding of animals’ cognitive abilities has advanced considerably since Regan first formulated his
theory, and they are now credited with much more intelligence
than in the past, including remarkable problem-solving abilities, in some cases, self-consciousness. Nevertheless, Christine Korsgaard, in her influential Kantian account of duties to
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animals, regards animals as non-rational because they are not
aware of the grounds of their actions, a necessary condition for
autonomy. She acknowledges that animals exhibit intelligence
and may even possess a kind of self-consciousness, but maintains that autonomy is distinct from these and that, as far as we
know, only human beings possess it (Korsgaard 2011, 101-3).
James Rocha takes exception to Korsgaard and makes a case
that animals may be minimally rational from a Kantian perspective, sufficient to warrant the precaution of treating them
with a “minimal amount of respect,” though he admits that
“animals are still likely to turn out to have limited rationality” (2015, 327). Most relevantly, he contends that engaging in
play is proof of animals’ capacity for free end-setting: “play
involves setting fun for its own sake as an end” (2015, 319). I
am skeptical about this account; play is undoubtedly fun, but is
the animal really “setting fun as an end” or simply doing something naturally satisfying? But even if play could be described
as free end-setting, this falls well short of the idea of autonomy
as requiring “reflection, foresight, self-assessment, sensitivity
to values that might structure a life, knowledge of the kinds of
life one [might] pursue,” etc.) (Sneddon 2001, 107).
Whether any animals possess autonomy is an empirical
question. It may be that a few species do have it, and then my
argument will not apply to those species. It is likely, however,
that even if autonomy does exist in animals, it will be limited
to a few species that are not commonly kept as pets. If, as I am
supposing, pet animals are not autonomous, only preference
liberty will be important to them; autonomous liberty will be
irrelevant. The following story will illustrate this distinction.
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Imagine that a group of rabbits lives in the middle of a large
forest. The range of these rabbits is quite small; they never
wander outside a certain clearing in the middle of the forest,
not because of any artificial pressure but simply because wandering far from their home burrow is not in their nature. Then,
imagine that, for some reason or another (perhaps the rabbits
are an endangered species and they need protection from human interlopers) a fence is built around the perimeter of the
forest. If the rabbits were to wander to the edge of the forest,
far from their home territory, they would find themselves confined. But they never do wander so far. They do not have any
desire to cross it, and never will, so it does not pose an impediment to the pursuit of their desires. The fence does not infringe
on the rabbits’ preference liberty.
Now imagine instead that there is a philosopher notorious
for never leaving the vicinity of his home town. He has never
had a desire to wander far, and in fact reacts very negatively
to any suggestion that he ought to travel farther. Then imagine
that we set up checkpoints on all the roads that he would take
if he ever were to leave town, with guards instructed never
to let the philosopher through. That this seems to be entirely
different from the situation with the rabbits presents a puzzle.
The philosopher, like the rabbits, is not prevented from doing
as he wishes, since he does not wish to leave town. So long as
he stays this course, he will never bump up against the wall we
have placed around him. It seems that we have not restricted
his preference liberty either.
One might say, “The difference is that we cannot be certain
the philosopher will never try to leave. Perhaps he will become
more open-minded about travel as time goes by.” Then let us
remove the issue of certainty, and say that we are looking back
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at the philosopher’s life after his death, and it turns out that he
indeed never did try to leave town. What harm, what foul, was
committed by having the checkpoints set up that he never tried
to cross?
The reply then comes, “But if he had tried to leave he would
have been prevented.” This concern seems to better address the
wrongness of our treatment of the philosopher. What happens
if we say the same of the rabbits? “Yes, the fence was far outside the rabbits’ range, but if they had tried to roam much further than normal, they would have been stopped by it.” Though
strictly true, it does not seem to have the same moral character.
Counterfactuals do not seem as relevant to their situation.
The root of this difference is autonomy. An autonomous being is capable of choosing his or her own ends, and full exercise
of autonomy requires that there be viable options. Even if the
philosopher fully endorses a homebody existence for himself,
for the endorsement to be truly meaningful, the “what ifs”
must be open. It must be the case that if he had chosen to be a
traveler, he would have been able to do so. This counterfactual
is significant for an autonomous being. For a non-autonomous
creature, it is not. Their deepest ends are not reflected upon or
chosen; they simply are. What matters to them is not choosing between ends, but avoiding frustration in pursuing the ones
that they do have. The rabbits do not need the option to do
something they will never want to do. What they need is to be
allowed to do the things they do, in fact, want to do.
Cochrane argues that liberty has a merely instrumental
value for animals, since it allows them to satisfy their desires
(Cochrane 2009, 674; cf. DeGrazia 1996, 269). It is the ability to satisfy those desires, not the liberty itself, that has in-
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trinsic value. Liberty has an intrinsic value only for autonomous creatures such as human beings. This is why, according
to Cochrane, it is wrong to deprive a human being of liberty,
but is not (always) wrong to so deprive an animal. Using the
previously-introduced distinction between preference liberty
and autonomous liberty, I would instead put it this way. Preference liberty has a value for non-autonomous animals; autonomous liberty does not. As the example of the homebody philosopher shows, it is possible to compromise autonomy without
infringing on preference liberty. Thus human slavery, however
benign, wrongs human beings; by its nature, it restricts autonomous liberty. Pet-keeping is not comparable because autonomous liberty has no meaning for most animals, and because
pet-keeping is, in theory, compatible with preference liberty.

Liberty and Animals
I have used the term “benign slavery” to refer to a state of
slavery in which the enslaved individual is provided with a very
pleasant life free of suffering and want. Such slavery could, in
theory, be consistent with having a great deal of preference liberty. If the enslaved is not significantly hindered in the pursuit
of her desires – because she is happy with her lot, and desires
nothing else – then she is like the penned-in philosopher: although other options have been closed for her, they are options
she is not interested in pursuing.
One may object that such a state of affairs is inconceivable,
because someone will always have a desire for freedom even if
all of her more worldly desires are met. I am not convinced this
is true. In the case of human beings, cultural conditioning, a
Brave New World situation, could conceivably result in people
who do not yearn for freedom at all. Even if it is true of human
beings, however, it is likely not true of animals. An animal may
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wish to escape from a cage, but it is because the cage is interfering with pursuing some object of her desire, not because she
desires freedom as such. As human beings, we resent the closing off of options in our lives even if we did not desire them
because it interferes with our autonomy. Non-autonomous animals are unconcerned with such abstract harms. So if the concept of slavery applies at all to animals, benign slavery would
be a possibility for them.
I conclude, however, that the concept of slavery does not apply to the kinds of animals that we keep as pets. The essence of
slavery is not the restriction of preference liberty; it is the restriction of autonomous liberty. This can be seen from the fact
that benign slavery is still a great wrong to human beings. For a
human being to be controlled by another harms her even if she
does not wish to leave. It harms her because if she had wanted
to leave that life, she would not have been able to. It wrongs her
in the way that we wrong the homebody philosopher by penning him in to his home town. It violates her autonomy even
if the life dictated for her is perfectly in line with the choices
she would make for herself. A non-autonomous animal is not
subject to such a violation. Pet animals can be, and are, harmed
in many ways, and our treatment of them is often abominable.
They may be our victims, but they are not slaves.
Even though pets cannot have their autonomy compromised,
it is true that their preference liberty is almost always restricted
to some degree. Indeed, the very concept of pet-keeping may
require it; it is difficult to imagine an animal whose liberty
is never restricted at all but who could still be characterized
as a pet. When we restrict a pet’s liberty it is ideally for the
animal’s own good: keeping a dog from running into the street
and being hit by a car, or forcing a cat to receive a vaccination.
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Burgess-Jackson (1998, 182-83) argues that paternalism and attendant restrictions of liberty are justified on the same grounds
that paternalism toward one’s children is justified. There is a
significant disanalogy: children will one day fledge, and animal companions will remain forever within our control.
What justifies our continuing to limit pets’ liberty, but not
our adult offsprings’, is that the pets will never achieve autonomy, and the children most likely will. Preference liberty has
an instrumental value for animals: it is valuable because it allows them to pursue their well-being. If an animals’ well-being
can be improved with some restrictions of liberty, then this is
justified. For an adult human being, a restriction of liberty for
the sake of well-being is typically not justified because of the
restriction of autonomy that it also causes.

Further Questions and Conclusion
Although the keeping of companion animals is not intrinsically wrong in the way that enslavement of human beings
is wrong, there are significant ethical problems with the way
it is currently practiced. Many restrictions of liberty imposed
on pets are not done for the animal’s own good but only for
the pet-keeper’s. They are often treated with a very low regard
for their well-being. It remains an open question whether petkeeping should be abolished, not because it is akin to slavery,
but because the state of affairs that renders it largely unethical
today is unlikely to change significantly. The morally acceptable pet-human relationship may be practically impossible to
achieve in a widespread way.
If pet-keeping is an institution worth perpetuating, then
further questions persist. What animals should we take in as
pets? Burgess-Jackson regards making wild animals into pets
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as more questionable than domesticated breeds (1998, 162), but
an argument for the moral significance of domestication would
be required. I am inclined to suggest that the significance of
domestication is simply that it facilitates keeping animals with
minimal restrictions of preference liberty. A domestic animal’s
desires are more easily satisfied in the domestic environment
than a wild animal’s. The moral permissibility of keeping a
given animal is dependent on whether that species’s needs can
be well met in captivity with minimal infringement of preference liberty. This also hints at the further applicability of my
argument to zoos.
What about domestication itself? The argument I have presented makes no claim about the process of domestication; instead I have sought only to evaluate the human relationship
with existing domestic animals. It could well be argued that we
ought not domesticate any more species, especially as the process of domestication must start somewhere, and the earliest
generations will still be wild animals and correspondingly illsuited to the domestic life. For dogs, cats, and other common
pets, that ship sailed long ago.
Finally, we must determine how to characterize the pethuman relationship. Hens, after rejecting master-slave as a
good model for the ideal pet-human relationship, considers
employer-employee, parent-child, and friend-friend, and finds
them all wanting, though with elements of truth to each. I have
used “pet” and “pet-keeper” throughout this essay in order to
remain neutral, especially as I sometimes discussed less than
ideal relationships. For an ideal relationship, “companion animal,” as it is now well recognized and avoids the ownership
implications of “pet,” is perhaps the best we can do. The idea
that an animal is owned in the same way property is owned
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is unjust and should be changed. Some kind of guardianship
model would probably better account for the obligations we
have to act in our pet’s interests and not just our own.
Those who regard pet-keeping as nothing less than slavery
have made a mistake; they have conflated preference liberty
and autonomous liberty. But those, especially in the general
public, who regard it as plainly morally unproblematic have
made a worse mistake. The current practice is a long way from
the ideal conditions that make pet-keeping theoretically acceptable.
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